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ON THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE OF 
CONFLICTING EMOTIONS: THE 
CASE OF EARLY MOTHER-CHILD 
INTERACTION AND ITS RELEVANCE 
FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOUR
abstract
In this paper I seek to define a first, preliminary basis for a dialogue between philosophy and 
psychoanalysis on the topic of emotional conflict. As I will argue, the interaction between mother and 
child in the latter’s first year of life represents a privileged vertex of observation on the positive effects 
that can be produced by coping with emotional ambivalence, both on the quality of the relationship and 
on the development of the child. Furthermore, tolerance for emotional conflict not only contributes to the 
development of the Self in the infant but it also favours the acquisition of prosocial attitudes, such as the 
capacity for concern, authenticity and creativity.
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ON THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE OF CONFLICTING EMOTIONS
In a well-known passage of the Symposium, Aristophanes talks about the mythological origin of 
love. Humans, he says, were cut in half by Zeus who wanted to punish them for their arrogance 
and their attempt to overthrow the gods. This punishment decreased their strength and made 
them more dependent, both on the gods and on each other. This original wound gave humans 
a permanent desire to recreate their initial unity and search for their lost half. This myth, 
according to Aristophanes, explains the origin of love, which can be essentially interpreted as 
a desire, in particular as the desire for Completion and Wholeness.
In a subsequent speech, Diotima interprets love as a basic human motivation, a vital force 
which generates the passions that animate human life. But - and through this argument she 
specifies Aristophanes’s myth - love is a desire for the Good only. No one desires anything that 
is bad. In particular, “even if lovers seek their other half for the sake of wholeness, they only 
want to be a whole with the good part, while the parts that are bad will be avoided and kept 
away. Good things, in their turn, are not desired for their own simple goodness, but are sought 
as the means to achieve happiness which is humans’ final end” (Naugle 2016). 
Plato’s idea of love as always directed towards what is good diverges significantly from 
the psychoanalytic view of love and hate as inextricable and omnipresent in our affective 
relationships. According to the latter, love has a dark, ambivalent side and is also directed to 
those parts of the Other that may hurt and frustrate us.
Since its inception, psychoanalysis has identified emotional ambivalence as a distinctive 
characteristic of our psychic functioning. A seminal development of the concept of emotional 
ambivalence was provided by Melanie Klein (1937, 1946, 1948, 1952). Afterwards, building upon 
Klein’s theory, Winnicott (1945, 1949, 1960, 1963) focused on the ambivalence of maternal affect.
In his article “Hate in the Counter-Transference” (1949), a famous paragraph describes at least 
eighteen reasons that a mother has to hate her child before the child learns to hate her. These 
include: “The baby is not her own (mental) conception”, “The baby is not one of childhood 
play, father’s child, brother’s child etc.” “The baby is ruthless, treats her as a scum, an unpaid 
servant, a slave” (Winnicott 1949: 72-73).
In this paper I argue that the emotional ambivalence theorised by Winnicott and Klein is not 
a symptom of dysfunctionality but has a constructive role and is functional for living and 
perceiving a life as authentic.
Furthermore, I suggest that the personal elaboration of ambivalence is not only significant for 





How may the psychoanalytic perspective on love and hate be reconciled with Plato’s view in 
the Symposium? I answer this question by focusing on the difference between the intelligibility 
of emotional conflict and intimacy with it. Although both are needed, they serve different 
functions, as I will explain.
In particular, intimacy with ambivalence is constitutive of a mature functioning modality of 
the psyche in which all components of reality can be perceived and accepted. Far from being 
only a personal achievement, such a capacity also has significant implications for society, as I 
will tentatively suggest.
Emotional ambivalence is the experience of having simultaneously both positive and negative 
feelings toward an object. Such an experience gives rise to an internal conflict in the subject, 
who feels love and hate at the same time, and toward the same person.
According to the English psychoanalyst Melanie Klein (1946, 1948), the coexistence of love and 
hate characterises human beings from their earliest days of life. Klein develops her argument 
through the analysis of the most primitive mental states that arise in children. According to 
her most famous theoretical contributions, the infant develops an integrated Self by going 
through the turbulent phases of the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position in 
the first year of life. The vicissitudes of these phases - how they are faced and dealt with in the 
relationship with, mostly, the mother - have an impact on the infant’s maturation and on her 
chance to reach psychic integration.
Klein (1946) uses the term “paranoid-schizoid position” to describe the earliest months of 
an infant’s life. Its most perspicuous evidence is the splitting of both the Self and the Object 
(the person to whom feelings are directed) into a “good part” who loves and a “bad part” who 
hates. The good and the bad part are not integrated but coexist in the Self and in the Other.
The infant uses phantasies of splitting, projection and introjection in order to deal with fear 
and anxiety that arise from her conflicting feelings. The most intense conflict has to do with 
the coexistence of love and hate in the relationship with the mother. She uses splitting to 
manage this unbearable ambivalence. Once her own feelings have been separated into loving 
and hating ones, she projects them into separate parts of the mother. As a result, the mother is 
also split into a good mother, or breast, from which love and gratification can be received, and 
a bad one, that is felt to be frustrating and persecutory.
If development proceeds normally, splitting will be gradually given up, the mother who is 
hated and the mother who is loved will be “put together” as parts of the same person and, 
accordingly, the Self will be felt as an integrated and tolerable mixture of good and bad 
components. But this stage will take time to be consolidated.
In the paranoid-schizoid position, binary splitting is still dominant and, in parallel, 
omnipotence and idealisation colonise the mind of the infant. Bad experiences are 
omnipotently denied and projected outside the Self to reduce persecutory feelings, while good 
experiences are idealised as a protection against the fear of the persecuting breast1.
The depressive position follows the paranoid-schizoid one. It begins in the second six months 
of life and is repeatedly refined throughout childhood and intermittently throughout life. In 
this phase, love and hate still coexist but love surmounts hate, thus promoting integration. 
At this stage of development, the baby realises and accepts that the hated mother and the 
loved mother are one and the same person. By re-composing the ideal and the persecuting 
1 Both constitutional and environmental factors affect the course of the paranoid-schizoid position. Constitutional 
factors include the life and death instincts in the infant and the balance between them. The main environmental 
factor is the mother and the quality of the maternal care that the infant receives. 
2. Love and Hate 
in Melanie Klein’s 
Contribution
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parts of the Object, she is enabled to re-compose love and hate in her feelings, thus developing 
a more integrated sense of Self.
As a fundamental consequence, the Self, the Object, and the world are perceived more richly 
and realistically. The Object is recognised as separate from one’s own Self and as real, while 
idealisation and illusion of omnipotent control over it diminish. 
Winnicott2 built upon Klein’s perspective by focusing on the mother-child interaction in the 
first year of life. The good enough mother that Winnicott (1945) describes is full of ambivalences 
about being a mother. When she takes care of her baby, she is selfless and generous, offering 
dedication and deep love, but she is also self-interested and prone to resentment. 
A mother has many and varied reasons to hate her baby as Winnicott suggests in his article 
“Hate in the Counter-Transference” (1949: 72-73):
The baby is not her own (mental) conception;
The baby is not the one of childhood play, father’s child, brother’s child, etc.
The baby is not magically produced;
The baby is a danger to her body in pregnancy and at birth;
The baby is an interference with her private life, a challenge to her preoccupations;
To a greater or lesser extent, a mother feels that her own mother demands a baby so 
that her baby is produced to placate her mother;
The baby hurts her nipples even by suckling, which is at first a chewing activity;
The baby is ruthless, treats her as scum, an unpaid servant, a slave;
She has to love him, excretions and all, at any rate until he has doubts about himself;
He tries to hurt her, periodically bites her and all, we say, in love;
He shows disillusionment about her;
His excited love is cupboard love, so that having got what he wants, he throws her away 
like orange peel;
The baby at first must dominate: he must be protected from coincidences, life must 
unfold at the baby’s rate, and all this needs his mother’s continuous and detailed study;
At first he doesn’t know at all what she does or what she sacrifices for him and 
especially he cannot allow for her hate;
He is suspicious, refuses her good food, makes her doubt herself, but eats very well with 
his aunt;
After an awful morning with him, she goes out and he smiles at a stranger who says, 
“Isn’t he sweet?”;
If she fails him at the start, she knows he will pay her out and for ever;
He excites her (sexually too) and frustrates her – she must not eat him or trade in sex 
with him. 
As this quotation suggests, a mother has many comprehensible reasons to hate her own child. 
What seems to be important, however, is not hate as such but its acceptance. The process of 
coping with ambivalence3 is indeed fundamental and requires an acknowledgement both of its 
2 Donald Winnicott (1896-1971) was an English pediatrician and psychoanalyst who devoted much of his professional 
life to the study of mothers and babies. Through his concepts of the “good enough mother” and the “transitional 
object”, he revolutionized psychoanalytic thought but also became a popular writer and contributor to the public 
debate on education and child care.
3  According to Winnicott (1945, 1949), such a process requires recognition of ambivalence as an unavoidable part 
of the mother-infant relationship. Only when this recognition takes place signification of ambivalence within the 





existence and of its potentially positive effects. Let me consider the effects for the mother first.
In my view, emotional ambivalence helps the mother in two main ways:
• The mother who is able to accept the conflictual nature of her feelings toward her baby 
without denying or minimising them will spontaneously resist the temptation to offer the 
baby an idealised image of herself, because she experiences the dark, ambivalent nature of 
her feelings and this makes her feel human, limited and imperfect. She will be authentic in 
the relationship with her baby.
• Such a mother is much more likely to gradually forget the “ideal baby” that she imagined 
during pregnancy and to start a relationship with the real one, the baby as she truly is, 
regardless of how different she may be from any idealised image. This will put her in touch 
with the authentic baby.
Let me now consider the infant4. In the first year of life, the infant’s Self is in development and 
depends on the maternal Self to emerge and become stable. In this phase, the infant exists 
only because of maternal care, together with which it forms a unit (Winnicott 1945). 
In particular, any infant starts with an inherited potential that can develop or vanish 
according to the quality of maternal - and then parental - care which is provided. Winnicott 
uses the expression “facilitating environment” to define a context in which the needs of the 
baby are sufficiently understood and met by her parents, thus guaranteeing the natural course 
of development:
Infants come into being differently according to whether the conditions are favourable 
or unfavourable. At the same time conditions do not determine the infant’s potential. 
This is inherited, and it is legitimate to study this inherited potential of the individual 
as a separate issue, provided always that it is accepted that the inherited potential of an infant 
cannot become an infant unless linked to maternal care (Winnicott 1960: 589).
Through satisfactory parental care, the baby starts to feel integrated, she becomes a “unit”, 
and, most importantly, she learns to differentiate “me” and “not-me”. This latter ability 
gradually leads her to see the mother as a separate object. Gradual, relative independence 
is then acquired through a sort of “mental detachment” from the mother which allows for 
differentiation into a separate self.
A mother who acknowledges and accepts the ambivalence of her feelings toward the baby 
helps her development in at least two ways:
1) The baby, by experiencing the love but also the hate coming from her mother, will learn 
to legitimate - and thus to maintain - both love and hate in herself as a natural and not a 
dangerous possibility, thus accepting their intermittence and inextricability as a constitutive 
part of the relationship. Thus the baby has the chance to develop her whole Self, without 
ignoring or excluding any part, in particular not minimising or denying the hating part.
2) Through contact with the integrated Self of her mother, the baby can develop the capacity 
to accept “the good” and “the bad” in the Other and to enter into relationship with both.
These achievements are essential for living and perceiving a life as authentic, so they strongly 
contribute to the well-being of the individual.
As Winnicott argues,
relationship becomes possible.
4  According to Winnicott, the terms “infant” or “baby” imply a child whose relationship and communication with 
the mother is mediated by maternal empathy and not yet by language.
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sentimentality is useless for parents, as it contains a denial of hate, and sentimentality 
in a mother is no good at all from the infant’s point of view. It seems to me doubtful 
whether a human child as he develops is capable of tolerating the full extent of his own 
hate in a sentimental environment. He needs hate to hate (1949: 73).
In other words, the baby needs to be in contact with the full spectrum of human emotions 
to learn that they all deserve legitimacy and that they all need to be preserved in order to 
develop an authentic Self. 
The nexus between emotional ambivalence and guilt further clarifies the importance of 
emotional conflict and its constructive potential in the affective world of the infant.
Emotional conflict does not only allow for the development of an integrated Self and for the 
capacity to be in relationship with an integrated Other, but it also represents the basis for the 
acquisition of other fundamental psychic capacities. For both Klein and Winnicott, by coming 
to accept the reality of her own aggressive drives, the infant gradually starts feeling guilty for 
her hate and responsible for the damage that the Object may have suffered because of her.
In a new-born infant, whose personality is still far from integrated, destructiveness and hate 
are unaffected by concern. Initially, the impulse is ruthless, unaware of the love and the hate 
that brings it about. The mother’s capacity to survive, however, allows for the emergence in 
the baby of a gradual capacity to differentiate between reality and fantasy, between the real 
mother who is still there and the phantasmatic mother who has been attacked and destroyed. 
Once the fantasy has been recognised as different from reality, the baby can feel fully 
responsible for the fantasy in all its dimensions - both positive and hostile. 
With the acknowledgment of one’s own aggressive drives, the capacity to experience a sense 
of concern for the damaged object develops. Such a capacity triggers the intention to repair, 
a constructive motivation that stimulates creativity. Indeed, the urge to repair is a vital 
sentiment that gradually strengthens, especially in the presence of a good enough mother who 
supports the child and shows - with her affective presence - that she has survived the hate and 
the aggressive attacks that were present in their relationship.
The nexuses that Winnicott has made explicit among tolerance of ambivalence, integration, 
sense of guilt, and reparation are not only significant for individual maturation. They also 
have a considerable social impact, for they promote, or inhibit, the emergence of a natural 
basis for collective morality (Winnicott 1963, 1966).
In fact, in the young child, tolerance of ambivalence allows for the spontaneous structuring 
of a moral sense - that is, the capacity to recognise the damage to the Other and to feel guilty 
about it (Winnicott 1958a). Such “primitive moral sense” is not inculcated in the mind from 
outside, nor is the result of an imposed code of conduct. Instead, it springs naturally from the 
dynamic of human affectivity, given that ambivalence has been recognised and accepted, first 
by the mother and then by the child5.
As Winnicott argues,
5  In Winnicott’s words, “in health the infant can hold the guilt, and so with the help of a personal and live mother 
(who embodies a time factor) is able to discover his own personal urge to give and to construct and to mend. In this 
way much of the aggression is transformed into the social functions, and appears as such. In times of helplessness (as 
when no person can be found to accept a gift or to acknowledge effort to repair) this transformation breaks down, and 
aggression reappears. Social activity cannot be satisfactory except it be based on a feeling of personal guilt in respect of 
aggression” (1950: 207).
Moreover, in unfavourable circumstances that prevents the emergence of the basic capacity for feeling guilty, “the 
implanted moral code is necessary but the resultant socialization is unstable” (Winnicott 1958b/1965: 24-25).
4. Capacity for 




 The study of the sense of guilt implies for the analyst a study of individual emotional 
growth. Ordinarily, guilt-feeling is thought of as something that results from religious 
or moral teaching. Here I shall attempt to study guilt-feeling, not as a thing to be 
inculcated, but as an aspect of the development of the human individual. (…) Those who 
hold the view that morality needs to be inculcated teach small children accordingly, 
and they forgo the pleasure of watching morality develop naturally in their children, 
who are thriving in a good setting that is provided in a personal and individual way 
(1958: 14).
Psychoanalysis has shed light on emotional ambivalence as an unavoidable human 
characteristic which can potentially promote healthy psychic maturation in the individual and 
the development of prosocial attitudes, such as moral sense and creativity.
Interestingly, in his Ethics, Spinoza anticipates a fundamental issue of psychoanalysis: the 
possible coexistence of opposite feelings for the same object of love: “If we conceive that a 
thing, which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another which 
is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall hate the first-named 
thing, and at the same time we shall love it” (Ethics, quoted by Greenspan 1980: 225).
As this quotation shows, Spinoza does not only allow for a form of ambivalence between 
love and hate that he calls “fluctuation, or vacillation”, but he also suggests a nexus between 
ambivalent feelings that are experienced simultaneously and the basic emotions of pleasure 
and pain coming from the same person (Greenspan 1980). Such a nexus has a clear affinity 
with the Kleinian idea of simultaneous gratification and frustration that the infant receives 
from the mother, due to the human impossibility to satisfy the Id - the impulsive part of the 
infant Self - in all its requests. This impossibility and the subsequent experience of pain and 
pleasure from the same affective source generate in the infant the inextricable mix of love and 
hate that Spinoza also describes.
Notwithstanding this affinity and although philosophers, as Geenspan (1980: 224-225) argues, 
nowadays know enough about emotions as “to question the familiar ideal of ‘philosophic 
detachment’ from them”, emotional ambivalence remains a controversial issue (but see Berlin 
1958), especially for those who consider emotions as a kind of rational judgement.
An analysis of the philosophical debate on emotions is beyond the purposes of this paper. 
Instead, I would like to suggest how philosophy and psychoanalysis could integrate their lines 
of inquiry on emotions, and especially on conflicts between opposite feelings.
I would like to start from this idea: the focal question is not how to free us from conflicts – as 
this is not possible and, were it possible, it would not be useful; but rather, the question is 
how we can become free to represent the conflicts in our mind and to feel involved in them. 
Representation of and involvement with emotional ambivalence are the neuralgic points.
While philosophy can enrich our intelligibility of emotional ambivalence by investigating the 
modalities through which it can be represented, psychoanalysis can guide us to recognise it as 
a constitutive part of ourselves, a part with which we are in intimate contact throughout life. 
Intelligibility and intimacy are different forms of knowledge and each of them has a specific, 
valuable potential.
The first is the result of a thought process which can widen the burdens of our comprehension, 
by eliciting the possible meaning that we attach to feelings and, also, by enriching our capacity 
to express them. 
Intimacy, on the other hand, is a mental and bodily condition which implies emotional 
contact. It makes comprehension less abstract and deeply rooted in a personal, and also 
physical, experience which is coloured by one’s own way of feeling and interpreting.
By integrating intelligibility and intimacy, I suggest that emotional conflicts deserve attention, 
5. Intelligibility 
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can be studied and fruitfully understood but that they also need to be recognised as a 
component of our identity, a part that plays a significant role in our development, for it can 
favour, or inhibit, well-being and social adaptation.
While intelligibility has to do with an intellectual process of comprehension and, as such, it 
presupposes the existence of a mature thinking mind, intimacy defines the affective ground 
for the development of such a mind. Moreover, it can affect the modality through which the 
mind is able to think, by influencing its capacity to “see” the world - and thus also one’s object 
of inquiry - in more or less realistic terms and to enter into relationship with all its parts, those 
which are compelling as well as the obscure, those easy to grasp as well as the ambiguous, with 
none of them being excluded or denied.
Furthermore, both intelligibility and intimacy with ambivalence need an affective 
environment to develop.
Intelligibility needs intellectual exchange, comparison and integration among different and 
interdisciplinary vertices of observation (Creighton 1922, Urban 1929). Intimacy requires - and 
also fosters - a mind/body active interchange and, most of all, the affective bond with another 
person (Mendelsohn 1982, Zaltzman 2007). On the one hand, it has its origin in the existence of 
drives or impulses that cannot be completely satisfied, e.g. it has a physical, bodily root. On the 
other, it characterises the dynamic of primitive affective experiences: an infant cannot learn 
to maintain - and thus cannot benefit from - ambivalence in herself unless she has a mother 
who accepts hate and keeps it within their relationship.
I also believe that intimacy with love and hate and intelligibility of their functions can be 
seen as mutually reinforcing processes that generate knowledge, provided that they are 
both recognised and considered. On the contrary, it would be a loss to take one and leave the 
other. For intelligibility which is not subsumed by deep emotional awareness is bounded to 
the surface of things. Equally, intimacy which is not supported by verbalisation and reasoning 
cannot become conscious and be valued in its many potentialities.
The psychoanalytic study of early mother-infant relationships6 gives us an image of love that 
is rather different from that which Plato offered us in the Symposium. Indeed, authentic love is 
not directed to the good only. Instead, it involves reciprocal acceptance of both positive and 
hostile feelings in both the Self and the Other.
The emotional ambivalence that arises in early mother-infant relationships does not vanish 
in childhood. Instead, it is continually experienced throughout life as an unavoidable and 
valuable component of our relationship with others. Moreover, it offers crucial contributions 
both to the individual, by favouring her development and the maturation of different psychic 
functions, and to society by contributing to the generation of prosocial forms of behaviour.
As far as the individual is concerned, the capacity to accept and maintain both love and hate 
for the Other in one’s own conscious mental sphere favours integration and authenticity. It 
also sustains the passage to the depressive position and to a creative way out of it, which is 
based on concern for the Other and trust in reparation. 
Pro-sociality, in its turn, is strengthened by emotional ambivalence in at least three main 
ways:
• First, the acceptance and personal development of ambivalence reduces the risk of acting it 
out, e.g. of an aggressive and uncontrolled attack on the Other;
• Secondly, it helps to mentally integrate reality in its multiple dimensions, thus affecting 
the capacity for realistic thinking;




• Thirdly, it is the basis from which moral sense springs naturally and sets its deepest roots, 
before being reinforced by culture and education.
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